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Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is one of the
greatest health challenges of our time. AIDS is a communicable dis-
ease for which there is currently no cure.' However, the means of
transmission of the disease are fairly well established,2 so that efforts
can be focused on minimizing the spread of the disease.3 A key to
reducing the spread of the disease is identifying infected persons, so
that they can receive education on how to avoid behavior that will
infect other persons.
A blood test has been developed to identify infected persons.4
The blood test detects the presence of antibodies to the Human Im-
munodeficiency Virus (HIV), which is the virus widely believed to
cause AIDS.5 The vast majority of persons who take such blood tests
do so voluntarily.6 However, for some members of American society,
* J.D., 1994; B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1990. I would like to
thank my family and friends for their patience and support throughout my time in law
school. I would also like to thank everyone who participated in the editing and production
of this Note.
1. PREVENTING ArDs: THEORIES AND METHODS OF BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS 1
(Ralph J. DiClemente & John L. Peterson eds., 1994).
2. See id. at 1 (explaining that sexual behavior and the sharing of drug injection
equipment are the principal modes of transmission).
3. See id. at 1-3 (discussing abstinence, condom use, cleansing of injection equip-
ment, and drug abuse treatment as means of minimizing the spread of AIDS).
4. Schwartz et al., Human Immunodeficiency Virus Test Evaluation, Performance and
Use, 259 JAMA 2574, 2578 (1988). The test begins with the enzyme-linked immunoassay
(EIA). Id. at 2574. If a positive result is achieved the assay is usually repeated. Id. at
2578. If the second result is positive the sample is confirmed by another test, usually the
Western Blot. Id.
5. Ralph J. DiClemente & John L. Peterson, Changing HIV/AIDS Risk Behavior:
The Role of Behavioral Interventions, in PREVETIMNG AIDS, supra note 1, at 1.
6. THE SocIAL IMPACT OF AIDS IN THE UNTrrED STATES 27-29 (Albert R. Jonsen &
Jeff Stryker eds., 1993).
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mandatory HIV testing has become a reality.7 Mandatory testing in-
volves an age-old conflict: the protection of individual liberty versus
the furtherance of societal and governmental interests. Some com-
mentators invoke the "slippery slope" argument when addressing the
issue of mandatory HIV testing, warning that allowing testing of lim-
ited segments of society will lead to widespread testing of much of the
population. 8 Other commentators argue that the threat of the spread
of the disease warrants testing of certain members of society.9 Both
arguments are compelling. While it is clear that substantial public
health measures are required to control the spread of AIDS,10 it is
also clear that controlling the disease through forced testing is a very
invasive procedure."
Strategies for controlling the AIDS epidemic can only be devel-
oped after careful consideration of the means to be used. The legal
profession is often relied on to police the means used to address major
7. See, e.g., Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1989) (prisoners); Plowman v.
United States Dep't of the Army, 698 F. Supp. 627 (E.D. Va. 1988) (surgical patient in
military hospital); Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (Ct. App. 1990) (per-
son who bit sheriff's deputy). Contra Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retar-
dation, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1989) (employees of social services agencies working with
mentally retarded persons).
8. See generally Karin Zink, Love v. Superior Court: Mandatory Aids Testing and
Prostitution, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 795, 819 (1992) ("In light of the Love court's
analysis [concluding that California's mandatory HIV testing of person's convicted of solic-
iting an act of prostitution does not violate the 4th Amendment] it is difficult to imagine a
situation, short of blanket testing, which would not withstand the court[']s scrutiny.").
9. See generally Robert Craig Waters, Florida's Involuntary AIDS Testing Statutes, 19
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 369 (1991) (speculating that Florida's statute requiring mandatory
AIDS testing of prostitutes is constitutional).
10. In 1992, 46,648 new cases of AIDS were reported in the United States. 41 MOR-
BIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 979 tbl. 1 (Jan. 8, 1993). In early 1992, at least 12.9
million people worldwide had been infected with HIV, including 7.1 million men, 4.7 mil-
lion women, and 1.1 million children. 5 AIDS REPORT 1 (No. 5) (July 1992) (citing statistics
released in JONATHAN MANN, AIDS IN THE WORLD 1992 (1993)). As of September 30,
1992, a cumulative total of 242,146 cases of AIDS in the United States had been reported
to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). 5 CALIFORNIA HIV/AIDS UPDATE 56 (Oct.
1992) (citing CDC statistics). Of the 242,146 AIDS cases, 160,372 AIDS-related deaths
have been reported. Id.
11. See Paul H. MacDonald, AIDS, Rape, and the Fourth Amendment: Schemes for
Mandatory AIDS Testing of Sex Offenders, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1632 (1990)("The de-
fendant's privacy interest in not being tested for HIV involuntarily is substantial, primarily
because of the inherent difficulty in keeping test results confidential and also because of
the frequent discrimination against individuals known or thought to be HIV-positive.");
Bernadette Pratt Sadler, When Rape Victims' Rights Meet Privacy Rights: Mandatory HIV
Testing, Striking the Fourth Amendment Balance, 67 WASH. L. REV. 195, 207-08 (1992)
(arguing that HIV testing is an invasion of privacy in a persons bodily integrity and an
invasion of a person's confidentiality interest in medical information); Zink, supra note 8,
at 815 (arguing that the stigma attached to the AIDS virus heightens the privacy
intrusions).
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social problems. However, legal history contains many examples of
how, in times of crisis, the vigilance of the legal world has failed. Case
decisions made during times of crisis haunt law school casebooks.12
The late Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote:
History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of
urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.
The World War II relocation-camp cases.., and the Red scare and
McCarthy-era internal subversion cases,. .. are only the most ex-
treme reminders that when we allow fundamental freedoms to be
sacrificed in the name of real or perceived exigency, we invariably
come to regret it.13
At odds with Marshall's call "for vigilance against unconstitu-
tional excess"' 4 is the real need to enact measures to prevent the
spread of AIDS. Researchers William B. Johnston and Kevin R. Hop-
kins warn:
Merely to wait for things to get better is to condemn hundreds of
thousands, even millions of people to premature death. This gener-
ation of policymakers may well be held accountable for these
deaths, because to some degree they are preventable .... Steps can
be taken now to save many of these lives as well as billions of dol-
lars in health care and other costs. Failing to take these steps will
leave a legacy of bitterness and division, along with the inevitable
questions: Who failed to act; who failed to lead? 15
Studies indicate that prostitutes are in a high risk group for the
transmission of AIDS. 16 These studies suggest that particular atten-
tion should be paid to this segment of society. One commentator
notes:
12. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (McCarthy hearings); Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Japanese internment in camps during World
War II); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (curfew on Japanese during
World War II); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (communist prosecuted for
disseminating written material).
13, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
14. Id.
15. WILLIAM B. JOHNSTON & KEVIN R. HOPKINS, THE CATASTROPHE AHEAD: AIDS
AND THE CASE FOR A NFw POLICY 17 (1990). It is noteworthy that Johnston and Hopkins
do not advocate mandatory testing. Rather, these researchers advocate the implementa-
tion of a two-step plan. First, they counsel, the extent of the infection must be determined
through a routine, national, voluntary testing program. Id. Second, "[Ijarge-scale efforts
must be initiated to encourage individuals to act on the basis of their knowledge of their
HIV status." Id. These efforts, according to Johnston and Hopkins, must strongly discour-
age HIV carriers from having sex or sharing needles with others. Id.
16. W.W. Darrow, Assessing Targeted AIDS Prevention in Male and Female Prosti-
tutes and their Clients, in ASSESSING AIDS PREVENTION 215-31 (F. Paccaud et al. eds.,
1992); Martin Plant, Sex Work, Alcoho Drugs, and AIDS, in AIDS, DRUGS, AND PROSTI-
TUTION 7-12 (Martin Plant ed., 1990).
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As the AIDS pandemic has spread its sinister reach through society
it has become clear that the two major modes of transmission are:
first, through penetrative sexual contact, anal, vaginal, and possibly
oral and, second, through the sharing of infected injecting equipment
by intravenous drug users.1 7
Prostitutes as a class are generally at risk in both of these respects.
Due to the fact that prostitutes have a high number of sexual partners,
the dangerous possibility exists that they will be infected with the dis-
ease and may pass it on. 8 Because of this "prostitutes may... repre-
sent a significant bridge [for the transfer of AIDS] into the
heterosexual community." 19
Researchers have also noted high levels of drug and alcohol use
by prostitutes to enhance sociability and/or deaden the realities of the
profession.20 A substantial portion of the prostitutes who use high
levels of drugs do so intravenously. There is "ample evidence indicat-
ing that intravenous drug use is commonplace among some groups of
sex workers."' A 1986 study of women with recent histories of pros-
titution revealed that 19.9% (138/693) of prostitutes who use intrave-
nous drugs were HIV positive and 4.8% (34/703) of prostitutes who
do not use intravenous drugs were HIV positive.22 A study of 360 San
Francisco male prostitutes found that 53.3% had used intravenous
drugs and 16.7% of those sampled, who had been tested for HIV and
had received the results, were HIV positive.23
These statistics indicate that prostitutes as a class are at a high
risk of infection relative to other populations. Because of their associ-
ation with high risk activities and the potential dangers of spreading
AIDS into other segments of society, the interest in enacting measures
17. AIDS, DRUGS, AND PROSTITUTION, supra note 16, at xv (emphasis added).
18. AIDS, DRUGS, AND PROSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 7 (explaining that multiple
sex partners and intravenous drug use place prostitutes and their clients at risk of HIV
infection).
19. See JOHNSTON & HOPKINS, supra note 15, at 90 ("While there is no evidence yet
that such widespread viral transmission is occurring [from prostitution] . . . . This bridge
could become more dangerous in the future if infectiousness increases over time."). The
class of people at potential risk is considerable. About 15% of unmarried men and 4% of
married men claim to visit prostitutes with some frequency and 25% of unmarried men and
7% of married men claim to have done so on occasion. Id. at 74.
20. Id. at 6-7. Some population-wide studies also show a "clear connection between
the use of alcohol and illicit drugs during sexual activity and failure to comply with 'safer
sex' guide-lines intended to minimize AIDS risks." Id. at 3 (citing studies by R. Stall from
1986-89 and Robertson and Plant in 1988).
21. Martin Plant, Sex work, Alcohol, Drugs, and AIDS, in AIDS, DRUGS, AND PROS-
TITUTION, supra note 16, at 7.
22. William Darrow, Prostitution, Intravenous Drug Use, and HIV-I in the United
States, in AIDS, DRUGS, AND PROSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 28 tbl. 2.2.
23. Dan Waldorf & Sheila Murphy, Intravenous Drug Use and Syringe-Sharing Prac-
tice of Call Men and Hustlers, in AIDS, DRUGS, AND PROSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 115,
124.
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to lower the spread of AIDS through prostitutes as a population is
substantial.
Some state legislatures have set out to curtail the spread of AIDS
through mandatory HIV testing of convicted prostitutes.24 Legislation
mandating HIV testing of convicted prostitutes has twice been tested,
and twice upheld, in state courts.25 However, some legislators feel
that limiting HIV testing to convicted prostitutes is insufficient, and
favor mandatory testing of individuals arrested for prostitution.26 Two
states have actually enacted legislation extending mandatory HIV
testing to individuals arrested for prostitution.27
HIV testing in the case of arrest poses serious constitutional
questions. The requirement of a conviction acts as a safety screen to
reasonably insure that only members of the high-risk group are sub-
jected to the intrusion of mandatory testing. The absence of such a
requirement opens the door for abuse. On the other hand, a standard
less than conviction may serve the public safety goals of mandatory
testing by broadening the class of persons tested.
24. See CAL- PENAL CODE § 1202.6 (Deering 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-7-
201.5, 18-7-201.7 (West Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 796.08 (West Supp. 1994); GA.
CODE ANN. § 31-17-1 (1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730, para. 5/5-5-3(g) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.090 (Baldwin Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.5129 (West 1992); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 201.356 (Michie 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 23-07.7-.01 (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-255 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-10-1311 (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-346.1 (Michie Supp. 1991);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.24.340 (West 1992); W. VA. CODE § 16-3c-2(5) (Supp. 1993).
This Note only considers one side of the prostitution equation, the testing of prostitutes.
The World Health Organization has commented that "HIV transmission requires the ac-
tive participation of two persons." WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GLOBAL PROGRAM
ON AIDS PROGRESS REPORT (World Health Organization, Geneva), Oct. 1988, at 4.
Although this statement lacks truth in some cases, such as forcible sex crimes, it is true
regarding prostitution. The constitutionality of the testing of customers of prostitutes is
beyond the scope of this Note. However, it is worth noting that many of the laws mandat-
ing testing of prostitutes also mandate testing of the prostitutes' patrons. See, e.g., COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-205.5 (West Supp. 1993).
25. See Love v. Superior Court, 276 Cal. Rptr. 660 (Ct. App. 1990) (upholding
mandatory HIV testing of convicted prostitutes); People v. Adams, 597 N.E.2d 574 (II.
1992) (upholding mandatory HIV testing of convicted prostitutes).
26. Even before courts upheld the testing of convicted prostitutes, state legislators
proposed bills that would allow mandatory testing for arrested prostitutes. See H.B. 155,
Reg. Sess., LA (1992); H.B. 681, 398 Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess., MD (1992); S.B. 759, 177th
Gen. Court, Reg. Sess., Mass. (1992); H.B. 4049,87th Leg., Reg. Sess., MI (1993); A.B. 220,
205th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., NJ (1992-3); A.B. 5482, 214th Gen. Ass., 2d Reg. Sess., NY
(1991); A.B. 5483, 214th Gen. Ass., 2d Reg. Sess., NY (1991); S.B. 3489, 214th Gen. Ass.,
2d Reg. Sess., NY (1991); S.B. 3490,214th Gen. Ass., 2d Reg. Sess., NY (1991); H.B. 1395,
43rd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., Okla. (1991); H.B. 743, 176th Gen. Ass., Penn. (1993); S.B. 1982,
97th Gen. Ass., 2d Reg. Sess., Tenn. (1992); H.B. 1934, 97th Gen. Ass., 2d Reg. Sess., Tenn.
(1992); H.B. 26, 49th Leg., Gen. Sess., Utah (1992); S.B. 354, Reg. Sess., Vir. (1992); H.B.
2491, 52d Leg., Reg. Sess., Wash. (1992). These bills can be found on WESTLAW.
27. See IDAHO CODE § 39-604 (1993); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-524 (1994).
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Is mandatory HIV testing of arrested and convicted prostitutes a
constitutional way to curb the spread of AIDS or will we "invariably
come to regret" the taking of such drastic measures? This Note con-
siders the Fourth Amendment issues regarding the constitutionality of
both mandatory HIV testing of convicted prostitutes and mandatory
HIV testing of those arrested for prostitution. Part I of the Note
traces the development of the Fourth Amendment "special needs"
doctrine, under which mandatory HIV testing of prostitutes has been
upheld. Part II outlines the arguments and analyses of the two cases
that have upheld mandatory testing of convicted prostitutes. Part III
applies a Fourth Amendment analysis to mandatory testing in cases of
arrest for prostitution. Part IV considers hold and treat laws-munici-
pal ordinances that permit the detaining and treating of prostitutes for
venereal diseases-as justification for the testing of arrestees. Part IV
concludes that while blanket testing of prostitution arrestees is uncon-
stitutional, testing based on reasonable suspicion would survive consti-
tutional analysis.
I. The Fourth Amendment and the Special Needs Doctrine
Opponents of mandatory HIV testing of convicted prostitutes ar-
gue that such testing violates the Fourth Amendment 28 protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.29 Two courts have re-
jected this claim finding the testing valid under the special needs doc-
trine. This Part traces the development of that doctrine.
"The [Fourth] Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and
security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by of-
ficers of the Government or those acting at their discretion. ' 30 Only
searches and seizures that are unreasonable are prohibited. 31 The de-
termination of reasonableness "depends upon all of the circumstances
surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or
28. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
29. In addition to Fourth Amendment claims, courts have also considered equal pro-
tection and due process challenges to such laws. However, courts have found little merit in
these arguments, focusing instead on a Fourth Amendment analysis. See Love v. Superior
Court, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 666-67; People v. Adams, 597 N.E.2d 574, 584-86 (Ill. 1992).
Therefore, this Note focuses only on the Fourth Amendment analysis.
30. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989) (citing
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
31. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
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seizure itself. '32- Determining the standard of reasonableness that
should govern any specific class of searches requires a balancing test
between the need to search and the invasion that the search entails.33
With some limited exceptions, the United States Supreme Court has
found that searches and seizures are unreasonable unless conducted
pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate upon a showing
of probable cause.34
(a) Administrative Searches and Reasonableness
The Fourth Amendment protects against both unreasonable
criminal searches35 and unreasonable administrative searches.36 A
criminal search is a search conducted to acquire evidence to be used in
a criminal proceeding.37 An administrative search is conducted to ob-
tain information to be used to protect public health or to enforce state
regulations. 38
In Camara v. Municipal Court,39 a housing occupant refused to
allow officials to conduct a warrantless administrative search of his
residence. The United States Supreme Court found the occupant's
refusal justified because the statute allowing the search lacked the
necessary Fourth Amendment safeguards and was therefore unrea-
sonable.40 The Court framed the question regarding warrantless
searches as follows:
In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a gen-
eral exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement,
the question is not whether the public interest justifies the type of
search in question, but whether the authority to search should be
evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether
the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the govern-
mental purpose behind the search.41
The Court found that the warrantless search attempt in Camara
violated the Fourth Amendment. However, the Court did not impose
the probable cause safeguards present in criminal searches as a re-
quirement for obtaining an administrative warrant.42 Noting that the
scope of probable cause required is related to the governmental inter-
est justifying the intrusion, the Court found that probable cause in
32. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985).
33. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
34. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
35. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
36. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
37. See MacDonald, supra note 11, at 1618.
38. Id.
39. 387 U.S. 523, 525-26 (1967).
40. Id. at 534.
41. Id. at 533.
42. Id. at 538-39.
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administrative searches does not require individualized suspicion. 43
The Court required only that "reasonable legislative or administrative
standards" for the inspection exist. For example, while the govern-
mental interest in recovering stolen goods or contraband in a criminal
case does not justify a "sweeping search of an entire city," the govern-
mental public health and safety interest in enforcing universal mini-
mum private property standards will justify "routine periodic
inspections of all structures. '44
(b) Warrantless Searches: A Framework for Cases of Special Need
In New York v. Burger,4 5 the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered "whether the warrantless search of an automobile junkyard,
conducted pursuant to a statute authorizing such a search, falls within
the exception to the warrant requirement for administrative inspec-
tions of pervasively regulated industries. '46
The Court began its Fourth Amendment analysis by noting that
an owner of a business has a reasonable expectation of privacy in com-
mercial property.47 However, the expectation is lessened in cases in
which the business is part of a "closely regulated" industry.48 The
Court explained that, in this context, "as in other cases of 'special
need' . . . where the privacy interests of the owner are weakened and
the government interests in regulating particular businesses are con-
comitantly heightened" the warrant and probable-cause requirements
have lessened application and a warrantless inspection may even be
reasonable. 49
Under Burger, the Court established that generally three criteria
must be met for a warrantless inspection of a pervasively regulated
business to be reasonable.5 0 First, there must exist a "'substantial'
government interest that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to
which the inspection is made .... Second, the warrantless inspection
must be 'necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme."' 5' Third, the
certainty and regularity of the application of the inspection program
must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a search war-
rant.52 To provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a search
warrant "the regulatory statute must perform the two basic functions
43. Id. at 538.
44. Id. at 535-60.
45. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
46. Id. at 693.
47. Id. at 699.
48. Id. at 700.
49. Id. at 702 (citations omitted).
50. Id.
51. Id. (citing Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981)).
52. Id. at 703
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of a warrant, it must advise the owner of the commercial premises that
the search is being made pursuant to the law and has a properly de-
fined scope, and it must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers
.... In addition, in defining how a statute limits the discretion of the
inspectors, we have observed that it must be 'carefully limited in time,
place, and scope.' '53
Applying this analysis, the Court found warrantless administra-
tive searches of automobile junkyards constitutional. In subsequent
cases involving administrative searches, courts have applied the stan-
dards established in Burger.
(c) The Special Needs Doctrine Applied to Bodily Intrusions
Subsequent to Burger, the United States Supreme Court held
that a special government need can justify a Fourth Amendment bod-
ily intrusion conducted absent a warrant or any individualized suspi-
cion. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,54 railway
labor organizations challenged Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA) regulations that mandated blood and urine tests of employees
involved in certain train accidents and authorized railroads to admin-
ister breath and urine tests to employees who violated specific safety
rules.
The Court, finding the regulations to be administrative,5 5 applied
the factors discussed in Burger. First, the Court found the government
interest in railroad safety compelling and that railroad safety would be
furthered by regulating the conduct of railroad employees.5 6
Second, the Court found that warrantless inspections were neces-
sary to further the regulatory scheme. The Court noted an increased
interest in disregarding the warrant requirement when such a require-
ment would frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search.57
Because drugs and alcohol "are eliminated from the bloodstream at a
constant rate" the warrant requirement would delay the test, and con-
sequently reduce the possibility of detecting such substances. As a
53. Id. (citation omitted).
54. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
55. "The FRA has prescribed toxicological tests, not to assist in the prosecution of
employees, but rather 'to prevent accidents and casualties in railroad operations that result
from impairment of employees by alcohol or drugs."' Id. at 620-21. The Court refused to
define the boundary between administrative and criminal searches. "We leave for another
day the question whether routine use in criminal prosecutions of evidence obtained pursu-
ant to the administrative scheme would give rise to an inference of pretext, or otherwise
impugn the administrative nature of the FRA's program." Id. at 621 n.5.
56. Ld. at 628.
57. Id. at 623.
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result, the warrant requirement would hinder the possibility of effec-
tiveness of the regulations.58
Third, the Court found that the regulations provided an adequate
substitute for a warrant. Warrants serve two essential purposes: (1)
they assure the citizen that the intrusion is as narrow as possible and is
authorized by law,59 and (2) they provide the detached scrutiny of a
neutral magistrate. 60 The Court found these purposes served by the
regulations because the statute was narrowly defined, employees
knew of the testing program, and minimal discretion was vested in the
administrators of the program.61
Thus, the Court found that the regulations withstood the Fourth
Amendment test of reasonableness in the absence of a warrant or rea-
sonable suspicion, and that they served a compelling government in-
terest that outweighed the employees privacy concerns. 62
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,63 the com-
panion case to Skinner, the Court considered the constitutionality of a
United States Customs Service drug testing program that required
warrantless and suspicionless drug testing of employees applying for
positions involving interdiction of illegal drugs or requiring carrying of
firearms.64 Applying the Burger reasoning, the Court found that the
compelling government interest of preventing the placement of em-
ployees who use drugs in positions "where they might endanger the
integrity of our nation's borders or the life of the citizenry" consti-
tuted a special governmental need.65 The Court held that the require-
ment of a warrant would "divert valuable agency resources from the
Service's primary mission" while providing little or no additional pro-
tection to the employee's privacy interests.66 Moreover, the program
served as an adequate substitute for a search warrant because it was
defined narrowly and specifically, the employees covered were doubt-
lessly aware of the testing program, and the officer conducting the
tests had little discretion.67 Thus, the court found the program consti-
tutionally sound.
The Skinner and Von Raab cases set the stage for the courts to
consider the Fourth Amendment implications of mandatory HIV test-
ing. Those cases will now be considered.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 622.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 633.
63. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
64. Id. at 659-63.
65. Id. at 666, 679.
66. Id. at 666-67.
67. Id. at 667.
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H. The Courts and Mandatory H1V Testing of Prostitutes.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet heard a case in-
volving a Fourth Amendment challenge to mandatory HIV testing.
However, lower courts have upheld mandatory HIV testing in an ar-
ray of cases involving different segments of the society.68 Regarding
the mandatory testing of convicted prostitutes specifically, only the
California Court of Appea 6 9 and the Supreme Court of Illinois70 have
addressed Fourth Amendment or other constitutional challenges.
(a) Love v. Superior Court
In 1991 the First District Court of Appeal in San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, examined the issue of mandatory HIV testing of convicted
prostitutes.71 In Love petitioners had been convicted in the San Fran-
cisco Municipal Court of soliciting acts of prostitution. Upon convic-
tion they were subject to a statute72 requiring HIV testing and AIDS
counseling. Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of mandate in Supe-
rior Court challenging the constitutionality of the statutory testing re-
quirement.73 Upon denial of the petition by the Superior Court, the
women petitioned for a writ from the court of appeal on the grounds
that the statute violated: (1) their right to be free from unreasonable
searches, (2) due process,74 and (3) equal protection.75 The court of
68. See supra note 7.
69. Love v. Superior Court, 276 Cal. Rptr. 660 (Ct. App. 1990).
70. People v. Adams, 597 N.E.2d 574 (Ill. 1992).
71. Love, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
72. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6(a) (West Supp. 1992). "[U]pon the first conviction of
any person for a violation of subdivision (b) of Section 647, the court shall, before sentenc-
ing or as a condition of probation.... order the defendant to submit to testing for AIDS
.... " Id. In its entirety, the Penal Code requires that any person convicted of violating
§ 647(b) must undergo AIDS education and an AIDS test. The report of the test must be
furnished to the court and the California Department of Health Services, and the results
must be furnished to the defendant at sentencing. If the test is positive, the court must
advise the defendant that a subsequent conviction of prostitution will be treated as a fel-
ony. The report must be maintained as confidential "except that the department shall
furnish copies of any such report to a district attorney upon request." Id.
73. Love, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 661-62.
74. Petitioners contended that the statute violated due process because there was no
reasonable relation between its means and its ends. Id. at 666. Specifically, an individual
could be convicted of prostitution without the commission of a sex act or the transmission
of bodily fluid. Id. The court found that the legislative determination or judgment con-
cerning AIDS and the high-risk group of convicted prostitutes was not unreasonable. The
court agreed with the respondent that the relevant question should not be whether fluids
were exchanged during the particular act but "whether and to what extent the group af-
fected by the statute... are members of a group at high risk for AIDS, and whether and to
what extent such persons threaten to transmit the AIDS virus to the general population."
Id. at 666 (citing brief of the People).
appeal primarily addressed the Fourth Amendment claim that the
testing constituted an unreasonable search and seizure.
The court first acknowledged that the HIV test's requirement of
physical penetration76 for removal of bodily fluid and the subsequent
testing of the sample both constitute searches under the Fourth
Amendment.77 The court then recognized the control of a communi-
cable disease as a valid exercise of the state's police power and ac-
knowledged that the legislature is given great latitude in determining
the appropriate means for preventing the spread of disease.78
Courts accept as conclusive a determination by the legislative body
that a particular regulation is necessary for the protection or preser-
vation of health, so long as the determination is reasonable, not an
abuse of discretion, and the regulation does not infringe rights se-
cured by the Constitution. 79
The court then turned to the question of whether the search was
criminal or administrative. As discussed in Part 1(a), supra, a search is
considered a criminal search if its purpose is to acquire evidence to be
used in a criminal proceeding, whereas a search is considered adminis-
trative if its purpose is to obtain information to be used to protect
The court, however, recognized the danger to constitutional rights of blanket testing
requirements of entire classes of persons. Id. at 666-67 (citing Johnetta J. v. Municipal
Court, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666, 684 (Ct. App. 1990)). The court noted that the testing applies
only when a person is convicted of violating the statutory section and "has thus exhibited
behavior from which it can be inferred that he or she has been, and may in the future be,
sexually involved with multiple partners." Id. at 667.
75. Id. at 662. Petitioners argued that equal protection was denied because the sec-
tion of the statute that applied to violent sex offenders limits the use of the blood test
information while the section applying to persons convicted of lesser crimes does not. The
court, in analyzing the search and seizure argument, held the limitation on the use of infor-
mation was intended to apply with equal force to each statutory subsection and thus this
contention was rejected.
76. It is interesting to note that the legal doctrine surrounding mandatory HIV testing
may soon be revolutionized by a saliva-based test. Epitope Inc., an Oregon-based biotech-
nology company, is currently refining a saliva-based test that "has thus far proven to be
both sensitive and specific." Epitope Inc. Receives Grant for Rapid Saliva-Based AIDS
Test, PR NEWSWIRE 1005SE004, NW File 649, Oct. 5, 1989. Obtaining a saliva sample is
less intrusive than the drawing of blood.
77. Love, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 662 (citing Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 267 Cal. Rptr.
666, 675-76 (Ct. App. 1990)); see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602 (1989). "In light of our society's concern for the security of one's person . . . it is
obvious that this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation
of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable" and "[t]he ensuing chemical
analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data is a further invasion of the tested em-
ployee's privacy interest." Id. at 617.
78. Love, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 662 (citing In re Johnson, 180 P. 644 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919)
(allowing quarantine for venereal disease); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)
(allowing mandatory vaccination for small pox)).
79. Love, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 662 (quoting DeAryan v. Butler, 260 P.2d 98, 105 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1953)).
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public health or to enforce state regulations. The California
mandatory testing regulation-has no impact on the immediate criminal
conviction. However, if the test result is positive for HIV, the regula-
tion provides for sentence enhancement for any subsequent convic-
tions.80 Despite the enhancement clause, the court found the
mandatory testing regulation to be an administrative search because
the purpose of the enhancement clause was to deter acts known to
spread the disease and because the statute as a whole included provi-
sions for education unrelated to any criminal penalty.8' Because the
search was administrative, the special needs doctrine could be applied.
The court noted that where the state uses its police power to
mandate testing "for the protection and preservation of the health or
safety of its citizenry," that testing, even though the testing is done
without a warrant, probable cause, or individualized suspicion, may be
upheld under the Fourth Amendment using the special needs doc-
trine.8 2 The court felt two questions had to be answered affirmatively
to uphold the regulation: (1) did the regulation arise from a special
need beyond those of ordinary law enforcement, and (2) if so, was the
intrusion justified by the special need?8 3
After reviewing the statute, the court answered the first question
affirmatively. The special need was "revealed by the provisions of the
act, the legislative history of the act and findings of the Legislature
regarding AIDS and AIDS testing." 4 The court took notice of a state
publication which instructed that "[t]he primary public health pur-
poses of counseling and testing are to help uninfected individuals initi-
ate and sustain behavioral changes that reduce their risk of becoming
infected and to assist infected individuals in avoiding infecting
others. '8 5 The publication also stated that "[m]ale and female prosti-
tutes should be counseled and tested and made aware of the risks of
HIV infection to themselves and others .... Local or state jurisdic-
tions should adopt procedures to assure that these instructions are fol-
lowed. ''8 6 Thus the court was convinced that the provisions of the
statute furthered its broad purpose-the prevention of the spread of
AIDS-and constituted "an obvious and compelling 'special need.' 87
80. Id. at 667.
81. Id. at 664.
82. Id at 662.
83. Id. at 663 (quoting Johnetta J., Municipal Court, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666, 677 (Ct. App.
1990)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 664 (quoting a 1986 U.S. Public Health Service publication entitled "Guide-
lines for Counseling and Antibody Testing to Prevent HIV Infection and AIDS" published
in 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WESKLY REP. 509 (Aug. 14, 1987)).
86. Id. (citing 36 MoRaIDrrY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 509, 513 (Aug. 14, 1987)).
87. Id.
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The court then balanced this special need against the intrusion to
determine whether the intrusion was justified. Citing previous author-
ity, the court first found that the physical intrusion, the drawing of
blood, is accepted as minimal.88 Then, the court construed the confi-
dentiality provisions of the statute narrowly, finding that the medical
information revealed from the chemical testing of the blood is subject
to disclosure restrictions that protect confidentiality.8 9 Therefore,
both types of intrusions-the physical withdrawal of blood and the
testing of the blood-were minimal. Without much more discussion,90
the court concluded that the government's special need to attempt to
prevent the spread of AIDS outweighed the minimal and confidential
intrusions of those persons convicted of prostitution.
A reading of Love does not leave one satisfied that the constitu-
tional question of mandatory HIV testing has been adequately ad-
dressed. The court's balancing of state need and individual intrusion
lacks depth. For example, the court fails to address whether a con-
victed prostitute has a lowered expectation of privacy. Moreover, the
court's narrow interpretation of the confidentiality provision seems an
inadequate remedy given the potential personal trauma to a testee in
revelation of a positive test result.
Nevertheless, while the wisdom of legislating mandatory HIV
testing may be questioned, 91 such testing appears to be constitution-
ally sound. Where the gaps in the Love court's analysis leave one un-
satisfied, the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Illinois on the same
issue fills in those gaps.
88. Id. at 664-65 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624
(1989); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 777 (1966); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S.
432, 436 (1957); Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666, 679 (Ct. App. 1990)).
89. Id. at 665-66. After reviewing the wording and the legislative history of the stat-
ute, the court rejected "the proposal that the statute allows the district attorney to use test
results for purposes unrelated to the statute which requires disclosure to that official" and
accepted the interpretation of the Attorney General that allows disclosure to a district
attorney only for the reasons articulated in California Penal Code § 1202.1(c). Id. at 666.
The court solidified the narrow construction of the confidentiality clause by recognizing
that the Attorney General, as the chief law officer of the state, has direct supervisory au-
thority over every district attorney in the state under the California Constitution, Article
V, Section 13 of the California Constitution. Id.
90. Some commentators have criticized the Love court for providing inadequate rea-
soning and analysis in its decision. See Zink, supra note 8, at 812-18.
91. As noted by the Love court, the necessity of a legislative decision is conclusive on
the court. Love, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 662. This Note follows the same rule and does not
address the wisdom of effectiveness of mandatory HIV testing. This Note addresses only
the constitutionality of such decisions. However, it is worth noting that a number of com-
mentators disfavor mandatory HIV testing. See generally JOHNSTON & HOPKINS, supra
note 15, at 17 (favoring voluntary testing and education campaigns); Sadler, supra note 11
(same).
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(b) People v. Adams
A more detailed analysis of the issue is set forth in People v. Ad-
ams,92 an Illinois Supreme Court decision. In Adams the complain-
ants were two women who had been separately convicted in Cook
County for prostitution.93 Following their convictions, and pursuant
to statute,94 the women were ordered to undergo testing to determine
whether they were carriers of the HIV.
The women challenged the constitutionality of the statute, and
the trial judge found in their favor on two different grounds. The
court determined that the testing procedure was an illegal search and
seizure and that it denied the defendants their right to equal protec-
tion.95 The Illinois Supreme Court then reviewed the decision under
an Illinois rule of court that gives jurisdiction to the state supreme
court for appeals from a ruling that a statute is unconstitutional. 96
Two issues were presented on appeal: (1) whether the testing consti-
tuted an illegal search and seizure, and (2) whether the statute denied
the defendants equal protection of the laws. 97 The opinion of the Illi-
nois Supreme Court principally addresses the Fourth Amendment un-
reasonable search and seizure claim.98
92. 597 N.E.2d 574 (Ill. 1992).
93. Id. at 576.
94. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3(g) (1989). The statute provided:
Whenever a defendant is convicted of an offense under [the prostitution statutes]
. .. the defendant shall undergo medical testing to determine whether the defend-
ant has any sexually transmissible disease, including a test for infection with
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or any other identified causative agent of
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). Any such medical test shall be
performed only by appropriately licensed medical practitioners and may include
an analysis of any bodily fluids as well as an examination of the defendant's per-
son. Except as otherwise provided by law, the results of such test shall be kept
strictly confidential by all medical personnel involved in the testing and must be
personally delivered in a sealed envelope to the judge of the court in which the
conviction was entered for the judge's inspection in camera. Acting in accord-
ance with the best interests of the victim and the public, the judge shall have the
discretion to determine to whom, if anyone, the results of the testing may be
revealed.
Id. This statute has been recodified as ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 730, § 5/5-5-3(g) (1989 & Supp.
1993).
95. Adams, 597 N.E.2d at 577.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. The Illinois Supreme Court in Adams found that the statute did not violate the
equal protection laws of the federal or Illinois Constitutions. Id. at 584-86 (citing U:S.
CONST. amend. XIV; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2). First, the court found that the statute drew no
distinction between male and female offenders and that there was no evidence of an intent
by the legislature to disadvantage female offenders. Id. at 585. Thus, the statute did not
violate the Illinois Constitution's prohibition of sex-based discrimination. ILL. CONST. art.
I, § 18. The court further found that the statute did not violate the federal equal protection
1579
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As in Love, the court found that both the drawing of the blood
sample and the subsequent test on the sample implicated Fourth
Amendment interests.99 To determine the reasonableness of the
search, the court balanced the importance of the state interest under
the statute against the nature and scope of the intrusion on an individ-
ual's Fourth Amendment rights. 100 In its balancing analysis, the court
found the Burger factors satisfied.
The search was classified by the court as administrative because,
rather than serving the ordinary needs of law enforcement, it serves
the public health and safety goal of controlling the spread of AIDS by
identifying persons infected with the virus. The "manifest purpose" of
the statute "is to help control the spread of AIDS by identifying per-
sons infected with the causative virus."'' 1 The state interest was given
great weight: "There are few, if any, interests more essential to a sta-
ble society than the health and safety of its members.' l02 The court
thus found the first prong of the Burger test fulfilled: the statute
served a compelling state interest that constituted a special govern-
mental need.10 3
The court then balanced this compelling state interest against the
intrusion on personal freedom. The court first discussed the warrant
issue, finding that the warrant requirement exists to guarantee that
search and seizures are not arbitrary and to ensure the judgment of a
neutral third party.10 4 The court held, however, that a warrant was
not required because the statute triggered only after conviction and
thus does not allow for discretion in enforcement. 0 5 "Under this
clause because, since sexual activity is one of the main means by which HIV is transmitted
from one person to another, the inclusion of prostitution among the criminal offenses for
which testing would be required was appropriate. Id. at 586.
It is interesting to note that as of August 14, 1991 in Los Angeles, California, the only
two cases filed against prostitutes for plying their trade after testing positive for the AIDS
virus were filed against male prostitutes. Valerie Kuklenski, Male Prostitute Charged With
AIDS Felony, UPI, Aug. 14, 1991.
99. Adams, 597 N.E.2d at 579 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 616 (1989); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)).
100. Id. at 580.
101. Id. at 581. The court discussed the provisions of the statute finding that: (1) at-
risk groups would be targeted, (2) the results would be confidential, subject to the discre-
tion of the trial judge, (3) the victims of the defendants conduct could be notified, (4) the
defendants themselves could receive treatment, and (5) the infected individual could alter
his or her conduct so that other members of the public would not become exposed to the
virus. Id.
102. Id. at 580-81 (citing Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905)("Upon the
principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right to protect
itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.")).
103. Id. at 581, 584.
104. Id. at 581.
105. Id.
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[statute] there would be nothing for the presiding judge.., to weigh if
issuance of a warrant were to be required."'1 06 Thus, the third prong
of the Burger test, the regulation as an adequate substitute for a war-
rant, was found to be satisfied.
The second prong of the Burger test-whether the warrantless
inspection is necessary to further the regulatory scheme-was then
addressed. Ordinarily, even in the absence of a warrant, probable
cause or some degree of individualized suspicion is required.107 How-
ever, in limited circumstances when the intrusion is minimal and an
important government interest would be jeopardized by requiring in-
dividualized suspicion, searches lacking suspicion are reasonable. 0 8
The court found extraction of blood to be a relatively minor proce-
dure involving "virtually no risk, trauma, or pain" that "has become
routine in our everyday life."'1 9 Furthermore, individualized suspi-
cion would be impracticable because there are often no outward man-
ifestations of the disease aside from an individual's membership in a
high-risk group." 0 Because an individualized suspicion requirement
would jeopardize the state's goal of identifying HIV carriers among
certain high risk groups, the court found that a warrantless inspection
was necessary to further the regulatory scheme.1 '
The court did recognize that information obtained as the result of
a positive HIV test could have a devastating impact on individuals,
affecting their psychological well-being and subjecting them to social
disapproval." 2 However, the court found that these consequences did
not make the test more objectionable for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses, stressing that the judicial inquiry should focus on the actual
physical intrusion caused by the search." 3
Additionally, it was noted that offenders necessarily have re-
duced expectations of privacy because the testing requirement is acti-
vated by a person's conviction for one of the offenses listed in the
106. Id. at 581-82.
107. Id. at 582 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624
(1989)).
108. Id. (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668
(1989)("Our precedents have settled that, in certain limited circumstances, the Govern-
ment's need to discover ... latent or hidden conditions ... is sufficiently compelling to
justify the intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting such searches without any measure
of individualized suspicion.")).
109. Id. (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966); Breithaupt v.
Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957)).
110. Id. at 583.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 583-84.
113. Id
statute. 114 "[The statute operates only at that point in the proceed-
ings when a defendant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence
but instead stands at the threshold of incarceration, probation, or
other significant curtailment of personal freedom."'115 Finally, the
court noted that the issue was not whether the state has the best or
most effective means of combating the disease, but whether the means
chosen by the state could withstand constitutional scrutiny.116
The Adams decision provides a much more complete argument
than Love. The court properly classified the testing as administrative
and addressed both the government's heightened interest and the con-
victed testee's reduced expectation of privacy. Moreover, all of the
Burger criteria are thoroughly addressed. The Adams case provides
convincing reasoning for the constitutionality of testing of convicted
prostitutes. But if testing convicted prostitutes is constitutional what is
the next possible legislative step?
Many commentators believe that the special needs analysis opens
the door for testing in a much broader array of situations. One
scholar wrote, "[In] light of the Love court's analysis it is difficult to
imagine a situation, short of blanket testing, which would not with-
stand the court's scrutiny.""17 Some legislatures have already enacted
114. Id. at 583 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (probationer's home);
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (prisoner's cell); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979) (pretrial detainee's body cavities)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 584.
117. Zink, supra note 8, at 819. In fact, some mandatory testing cases do extend fur-
ther than Love and Adams by applying mandatory testing to groups that are not at such a
high risk, and in situations in which the risk of infection is very low. For example, a recent
California appellate decision, Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (Ct. App.
1990), upheld a statute providing for HIV testing of persons charged in a criminal com-
plaint when probable cause existed to believe that a transfer of bodily fluid occurred be-
tween the person charged and a public safety officer. In Johnetta, the defendant had bitten
a public safety officer. The court found the statute constitutional under the "special needs"
doctrine despite the fact that no individualized suspicion that the defendant was infected
existed and that, even if afflicted, saliva transfer as a means of contracting AIDS was, at
best, a "theoretical possibility." The court explained:
The record below establishes that HIV can be found, albeit in small amounts, in
saliva. The experts essentially agree there is a theoretical possibility of saliva
transfer, and the trial court so found. Although this possibility is extremely low,
the majority of the experts agreed that the possibility cannot be categorically
ruled out ... and that the available evidence is insufficient to determine conclu-
sively that HIV cannot be transferred through a bite.
Id. at 680-81. The court identified the special need as the state's interest in protecting the
health and safety of its employees faced with the possibility of becoming infected with HIV
in the line of duty. Id. at 679-80.
Despite Zink's predictions and cases like Johnetta, the manner in which the disease is
spread indicates that blanket testing will probably never be a reality. The only docu-
mented means of transmission are through exchanges of blood or sexual contact. JOHN-
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regulations to broaden testing in some situations. One situation-the
testing of arrested prostitutes-is now considered.
I. Does Testing of Arrested Prostitutes Withstand
Constitutional Analysis?
In many states, legislation proposing mandatory HIV testing for
those arrested for prostitution has either been enacted or is pend-
ing. 18 Even before any such legislation was enacted, mandatory HIV
testing of arrestees was not unheard of. A 1992 United Press Interna-
tional release reported that police in Bensalem, Pennsylvania were or-
dered to halt the practice of HIV testing of individuals arrested for
prostitution." 9 The following Part will analyze the constitutionality of
extending mandatory HIV testing to those individuals arrested for
prostitution before a conviction is secured.
Mandating testing of those arrested for prostitution causes a con-
siderable shift in the balance of interests associated with the Fourth
Amendment as applied in Love and Adams. Application of the Bur-
STON & HOPKINS, supra note 15, at 27. The majority of people, who do not engage in
promiscuous sex or intravenous drug abuse, are, at the present time, at little risk of catch-
ing the disease. JOHNSTON & HOPKINS, supra note 15, at 27. Furthermore,
relative to other diseases AIDS is difficult to catch. Although estimates vary, the
chances of transmitting the virus during a single sexual contact with an infected
person appear to be less than two in ten thousand. In studies of accidental punc-
ture wounds with infected needles in hospital settings, only four cases of infection
have occurred in more than twelve hundred incidents.
Id.
Moreover, even in Johnetta, where testing was allowed when there was only a theoreti-
cal possibility of transfer, the court recognized that there are limits to the mandatory HIV
testing:
Skinner ... has [not] relegated blood testing in all cases to the "bargain base-
ment" of the Fourth Amendment where minimal intrusions may be made by the
government without probable cause. Certainly a statute mandating blood testing
for AIDS of the entire population, or as a precondition for certain rights or privi-
leges unrelated to AIDS infection and not connected to furthering a serious gov-
ernmental need, would raise serious-and perhaps insurmountable-
constitutional objections.
Johnetta J., 267 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
118. See supra notes 26-27.
119.
Police in the Bucks County community of Bensalem have been ordered to halt
the practice of testing alleged prostitutes for the AIDS virus. District Attorney
Alan Rubinstein said Tuesday police can administer the test only if they can
prove a 'significant risk' that someone will be exposed to the AIDS virus.
Police Told to Halt AIDS Tests, UPI, Oct. 14, 1992. Rubinstein said that under state law,
HIV tests can only be given if an officer has been exposed to a bodily fluid. "Even then,
the suspect must consent to the test and the result can only be released by the courts." Id.
One woman was charged with reckless endangerment after testing positive. Id.
ger criteria reveals that mandatory testing of all arrested prostitutes is
unconstitutional.
Since the testing of arrestees serves the same state interests as the
testing of convictees, the first prong of Burger-the furthering of a
compelling state interest-is not altered. The interest in preventing
the spread of AIDS remains a compelling public health interest that
advances a special need. Moreover, the goal of controlling the spread
of AIDS would be furthered by testing arrested prostitutes.
The second prong of Burger would be satisfied because warrant-
less inspections will nearly always be necessary to further a regulatory
scheme regarding HIV testing. Because there is generally no outward
manifestation of the disease, there is generally no information on
which to base individualized suspicion or probable cause that one has
AIDS, regardless of whether the testee is a convicted prostitute or an
arrestee.
Mandatory HIV testing of arrestees, however, fails the third
prong of Burger-whether the regulation is an adequate substitute for
a warrant. The purpose of a warrant issued by a magistrate (and the
purpose of a conviction) is to have the intrusion approved by a neutral
party and to limit the discretion of the police. An arrest statute is not
an adequate substitute for a detached magistrate. While the convic-
tion requirement allows the opportunity for a neutral fact finder to
determine guilt, an arrest standard does not provide an opportunity
for a neutral evaluation.
Rather, a warrantless, suspicionless test based on an arrest trans-
fers the discretion to the authorities who actually make arrests. Plac-
ing both the authority to arrest and test in one body allows for the
possibility of abuse through selective arrests. If the conviction by a
neutral fact-finding body is not required, authorities could arrest indi-
viduals simply to test them, using the arrest merely as a pretext.
"'When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of
search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a police-
man or government enforcement agent. ' '" 120 Due to the amount of
discretion that would reside in police officers in the case of testing of
arrestees, and the potential for police indiscretion, such testing is
unconstitutional.
Testing of arrestees further fails the third prong of Burger be-
cause such testing is not a narrow intrusion-rather than testing a
member of a specific high risk group, testing an arrestee targets a
mere suspect. Both Adams and Love emphasized that the Illinois and
California testing laws are activated only after conviction, when a de-
120. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 529 (1967) (quoting Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
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fendant is no longer presumed innocent.121 An arrestee, unlike one
who has been convicted, has not been found by the judicial system to
fall within any high risk group. The only thing separating the arrestee
and the individual on the street is an unproven and perhaps unsub-
stantiated claim that the person is guilty of a crime. Thus, an arrestee
has a greater expectation of privacy and is entitled to a greater degree
of Fourth Amendment protection than a convictee.122 For these rea-
sons, mandatory testing of arrested prostitutes fails the third prong of
Burger and is unconstitutional.
IV. "Hold and Treat" Laws: A Constitutional Compromise?
If blanket mandatory HIV testing of arrestees is unconstitutional,
the question arises: Does a middle ground exist between the require-
ments of conviction and arrest? Currently, no proposed state statute
that allows for HIV testing upon arrest requires any intermediate
showing that the arrestee is in fact a prostitute. Such an intermediate
showing might provide a compromise. An example may be drawn
from "hold and treat" laws. These laws, usually municipal ordinances,
allow officials to detain and treat those individuals "reasonably sus-
pected" of having a venereal disease by virtue of the fact that they can
be shown-by various standards of proof-to be prostitutes.123
121. Love v. Superior Court, 276 Cal. Rptr. 660, 667 (Ct. App. 1990) ("Testing under
section 1202.6... applies only when a person has been convicted.., and has thus exhibited
behavior from which it can be inferred that he or she has been, and may in the future be,
sexually involved with multiple partners."); People v. Adams, 597 N.E.2d 574, 583 (Il1.
1992) ("[T]he testing requirement is triggered only upon a person's conviction for one of
the offenses specified in the statute. Thus, the statute operates only at that point in the
proceedings when a defendant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence but instead
stands at the threshold of incarceration, probation, or other significant curtailment of per-
sonal freedom.").
122. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (assuming that pre trial detainees have a
diminished expectation of privacy, and holding that visual body-cavity inspections do not
violate the Fourth Amendment).
123. See Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding "hold and
treat" laws valid constitutional exercise of police power); see also Welch v. Shepherd, 196
P.2d 235 (Kan. 1948) (allowing city health officer, by virtue of the police power, to use
force that is "reasonably necessary" to determine whether a person has a venereal disease
when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person is infected with a venereal
disease); Ex parte Fowler, 184 P.2d 814 (Okla. Crim. App. 1947) (upholding statute under
police power authorizing local health officials to "examine those arrested by lawful warrant
for ... prostitution" to determine if they have a venereal disease, but requiring health
authorities to show facts justifying restraint where a person questions their detention);
People v. Strautz, 54 N.E.2d 441 (Il1. 1944) (holding that a state's police power justifies
detaining persons reasonably suspected of being afflicted with a communicable venereal
disease and requiring the state to present sufficient evidence to the justice of the peace to
justify ordering such examination); Varholy v. Sweat, 15 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1943) (upholding
the detainment for treatment of venereal disease of a woman who, after being arrested for
being drunk and disorderly, voluntarily submitted to an examination); City of Little Rock
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(A) Reynolds v. McNichols
The 1973 case of Reynolds v. McNichols 124 is the only reported
federal case on the subject. In Reynolds a woman had been cited for
solicitation on five different occasions. 125 Under a Denver municipal
"hold and treat" ordinance, those arrested and charged with prostitu-
tion had a choice between (1) limited detention for the purposes of
examination for venereal disease and treatment for any disease, or (2)
submission to an immediate injection of penicillin without examina-
tion.126 On the first three occasions, the defendant submitted to ex-
amination and treatment for venereal disease.' 27 On the fourth
occasion, the woman, in the presence of her attorney, refused to sub-
mit to the examination and apparently was not tested.128 On the fifth
occasion, she opted to take penicillin orally in lieu of an examina-
tion.1 29 Based on this sequence of events, she brought a civil rights
complaint against the City and County of Denver, its mayor, and cer-
tain city officials and police officers.' 30 The complaint alleged that her
rights under the Fourth131 and Fourteenth 32 Amendments were vio-
lated, and she sought monetary and injunctive relief.
Under the ordinance, a person was reasonably suspected of hav-
ing a venereal disease by virtue of the fact that the person had been
arrested and charged with solicitation and prostitution. 33 The court
noted that the goal of the ordinance was to bring under control the
source of communicable venereal disease.' 34 The court also cited sev-
eral state court cases upholding similar statutes and cases holding that
the quarantining of persons to control infectious diseases is constitu-
tional.135 In light of these authorities, and without much analysis, the
court held that these laws were valid exercises of police power and
therefore constitutional. 136
Does the reasoning of Reynolds provide a middle ground upon
which mandatory HIV testing might be allowed, absent a conviction?
Upon a close analysis, the answer is a resounding no because the rea-
v. Smith, 163 S.W.2d 705 (Ark. 1942) (holding that detaining plaintiff, a prostitute, while
waiting for venereal diseases to be treated is constitutional exercise of police power).
124. 488 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1973).
125. Id. at 1380-81.
126. Id. at 1382.
127. Id. at 1380.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1381.
130. Id. at 1379-80.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1988).
133. Reynolds, 488 F.2d at 1381.
134. Id. at 1382.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1383.
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soning of Reynolds is flawed. In its analysis, the court stated that the
fact that the plaintiff was a prostitute-based on numerous facts in the
record in addition to the plaintiff's admission-was of "crucial signifi-
cance."'1 37 Yet, the court upheld the ordinance that on its face allows
testing of one who is "reasonably suspected of having a venereal dis-
ease by virtue of the fact that she has been arrested and charged with
solicitation and prostitution .... ,138 The court fails to acknowledge
that the ordinance would allow examination when the only evidence
of a person's status as a prostitute is the arrest. As discussed in Part
III, supra, a search based merely on the fact of arrest is unconstitu-
tional under the Fourth Amendment because a warrant substitute
does not exist. Thus, the Reynolds court should have invalidated the
ordinance on its face.
(B) California Hold and Treat Laws
While Reynolds does not provide a middle ground, California's
"hold and treat law" does. California "hold and treat" decisions re-
quire a higher standard of reasonable suspicion than does the Denver
ordinance involved in Reynolds. These decisions require reliable, in-
dependent evidence that the person is a prostitute before the person
may be detained for examination. 39
137. Id. at 1382.
138. 1d at 1383. But see id. at 1386 (Lewis, C.J., concurring) (noting that the court
does not have to "spell out the limitations, if any, that the word 'suspicion' may have as a
legal standard" and noting that "[s]ufflcient cause existed in this case for the authorities to
consider appellant to be a probable health hazard to the community").
139. See, e.g., Ex parte Arata, 198 P. 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921).
If the health authorities rely upon the claim that the person quarantined is a pros-
titute and hence likely to be afflicted with disease, then the burden is on the
quarantine officers to establish the proof of claim that the accused is of the class
and character mentioned. If such person has been legally convicted of being of
such class and character, the record of conviction may be relied upon to establish
the important fact. In the absence of such conviction, the burden will be with the
health authorities to establish the fact by sufficient evidence; for it is the existence
of that condition in the person suspected that furnishes the ground for the belief,
as an inference only, that the disease exists. It will not do to allow the inference
of probable cause to be drawn from a mere suspicion.
Id. at 816. The California "hold and treat" laws allow for evidence such as living in a house
of ill repute or proof of an encounter to allow examination prior to a conviction. See, e.g.,
Ex parte Martin, 188 P.2d 287, 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948)(basing reasonable cause on evi-
dence that "the premises in question was commonly regarded as a house of prostitution;
that it contained the usual paraphernalia generally found in such establishments; ... cases
of venereal disease had been reported ... there;.., several arrests had been made at the
premises on charges of prostitution ... and ... that the petitioners themselves admitted
having been engaged either in prostitution or in operating a house of prostitution"); Ex
parte Clemente, 215 P. 698, 698 (Cal. App. Ct. 1923)(basing reasonable cause on evidence
that "the house conducted by petitioners was a house of ill fame, that she was an inmate
thereof, and personally participated in the unlawful acts carried on therein"); Ex parte
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One case in particular, Ex parte Arata,140 foreshadows the issue of
HIV testing and illustrates the dangers of allowing detention and test-
ing after merely an arrest. In Arata the petitioner alleged that she was
arrested without a warrant and after spending two days in jail was
charged with committing an act of prostitution. 141 Petitioner pled not
guilty at her arraignment, and a trial date was set.' 42 She furnished
the required fifty dollars bail but the jailer refused to discharge her
because the Los Angeles Health Department had instructed that she
not be released until she submitted to an examination to determine
whether she was infected with a communicable disease. 143
Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the chief of
police was detaining and confining her "without process of law or law-
ful authority."'1 44 She further alleged that she was not infected with
any disease, that the city had no reason to believe so, and that she was
not a prostitute nor guilty of the crimes accused. 145
Respondent admitted that petitioner was being detained in the
city jail. 146 Narrative facts were presented regarding petitioner's
arrest and her alleged solicitation.147 The chief of police then ex-
plained the health department policy under which petitioner was to be
quarantined in the city jail until "examined by officers of the health
department ... to determine her freedom from contagious or infec-
tious quarantinable venereal disease."'1 48 Respondent alleged that pe-
titioner was held in jail due to her refusal to submit to an
examination.149
The court found that no sufficient cause had been shown by re-
spondent to detain petitioner.150 After payment of bail, "the right of
the chief of police to further detain the petitioner [could only] be justi-
fied on grounds having no reference at all to the fact that an accusa-
Dayton, 199 P. 548 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921); Ex parte Arata, 198 P. 814, 816 (Cal. Ct. App.
1921)(refusing to find reasonable cause based on the fact that "an accusation had been
made.., charging petitioner with a crime" and placing the burden with the health authori-
ties to "establish the fact [that the person is a prostitute] by sufficient evidence").
140. 198 P. 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921).







148. Id. The policy was based on "statute and the rules of the State Board of Health of
the state of California." Id. The city justified its policy based on the allegation that "90
percent of all women apprehended in the commission of acts of prostitution are infected
with contagious or infectious quarantinable venereal disease." Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 816.
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tion had been made... charging petitioner with a crime."' 1s While
the court acknowledged the right of the health department to quaran-
tine those "whom they have reasonable cause to believe are afflicted
with infectious or contagious diseases," it held that personal restraint
can only occur where "reasonable grounds exist to support the belief
that the person is afflicted as claimed.' S2 Whether there exist "rea-
sonable grounds" depends on the facts of the individual case. 53
The court agreed with the rationale that it is "reasonably prob-
able that a person found to be of the class mentioned" (i.e., prosti-
tutes) is infected with a venereal disease.' 54 However, the court
found arrest insufficient to show that a person belongs to such a class.
If the health authorities rely upon the claim that the person quaran-
tined is a prostitute and hence likely to be afflicted with disease,
then the burden is on those officers to establish the proof of the
claim that the accused is of the class and character mentioned.' 55
The court held that a conviction for prostitution automatically meets
the burden to detain a person until an examination has been made.' 56
Absent conviction, however, the health authorities must provide suffi-
cient evidence to show that a person is a member of the high risk
class.157 The court held that since the respondent failed to provide
such evidence, the detention was unauthorized. 58
Would a reasonable suspicion requirement based on a model sim-
ilar to "hold and treat" laws justify mandatory HIV testing of arrested
prostitutes? Possibly, but some problems do exist.
151. Id.
152. Id. (emphasis added). The court noted that when the person detained questions
the power of the health authorities to impose such restraint, the burden shifts to the au-
thorities to justify the detention by bringing forth facts establishing reasonable grounds.
IL "It might be proved, for instance, that the suspected person had been exposed to con-
tagious or infectious influences; that some person had contracted such disease from him or
her, as the case might be." Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. ("The presumption which this statement allows to be made as against the indi-
vidual in the first instance has its foundation in the fact that women of ill fame, by the very




157. Id. Other cases have held, for example, that proof that one lives in a "house of ill
fame" is sufficient evidence to show a person is a prostitute and therefore likely to have a
venereal disease. Ex parte Martin, 188 P.2d 287, 289-90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948); see also Ex
parte Dayton, 199 P. 548, 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921) ("Evidence consisting of oral testimony
of the witnesses and an affidavit were presented at the hearing, and from that evidence we
have reached the conclusion that the house at which the petitioner was residing was a
house of ill fame, and that she was one of the inmates thereof.").
158. Ex parte Arata, 198 P. at 816-17.
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First, the narrowness of the regulation must be evaluated. Al-
lowing testing of those only accused, even with a reasonable suspicion,
blurs the line between testing of the general population and testing
those proven to be in a high risk group.
Additionally the level of intrusion between the "hold and treat
laws" and mandatory testing differs. Thus, the balancing of reasona-
bleness may result in different outcomes. "Hold and treat" laws pro-
vide a choice between detention or ingestion of penicillin. Mandatory
HIV testing laws involve no choice. Moreover, mandatory HIV tests
involve the withdrawal and subsequent testing of the individual's
blood as opposed to the injection or ingestion of penicillin into the
bloodstream. This may skew the Fourth Amendment balance. Be-
cause a heightened individual privacy interest is involved with the
withdrawal and testing of blood, injections or prescriptions of penicil-
lin under "hold and treat" laws may be justified while blood testing
might constitute an unreasonable search. The balance may also be
altered because it is unclear whether persons who can be reasonably
suspected of being prostitutes have a lower expectation of privacy that
would justify testing in light of the governmental interest.
Finally, while California case law establishes the need for reason-
able suspicion apart from arrest, it does not appear that an actual
hearing is necessary. In California, cases subsequent to Ex parte Arata
established that:
the necessary proof [required to show that one is a prostitute] is
analogous to that required on a preliminary examination before a
magistrate prior to commitment on a criminal charge, the extent of
the inquiry being merely as to the existence of reasonable cause
pending opportunity for further investigation or examination. 159
However, while analogous to the proof required in a preliminary ex-
amination, a preliminary examination itself is not necessary. Rather,
the evidence showing reasonable cause need only exist "under the
facts as brought within the knowledge of the health authorities
.... "160 Under California "hold and treat" laws, only when a person
questions the power of the health authorities to restrain them does the
burden shift to the authorities to present evidence leading to a reason-
able cause. This presents Fourth Amendment problems because, in
cases in which a person does not question the power of health authori-
ties to test them, a hearing need not be held and thus a warrant substi-
tute does not exist.
While these problems are notable, they do not appear to be fatal
to mandatory HIV testing regulations. The Fourth Amendment diffi-
culties with testing arrested prostitutes could be cured with the re-
159. Ex Parte Martin, 188 P.2d at 290.
160. Ex parte Arata, 198 P. at 816.
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quirement of a hearing to show reasonable suspicion that an
individual is a member of a high risk group. The hearing would serve
much the same function as a trial resulting in a conviction.
The requirement of a hearing would narrow the scope of the reg-
ulation to cases in which sufficient evidence can be shown that an indi-
vidual is a member of the high risk group. Additionally, a hearing
would even the balance between the government interest and the indi-
vidual intrusion. A person shown by sufficient evidence to be in the
high risk group has a lessened expectation of privacy, more closely
resembling that of a convicted prostitute. A hearing would also serve
as a warrant substitute that removes discretion from the police and
places it with a neutral fact finder.
Thus, by combining the reasoning of California "hold and treat"
law with the requirement of a hearing, a legislature could enact a reg-
ulation for mandatory HIV testing of arrested prostitutes that would
be sufficiently narrow to survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
Conclusion
Mandatory HIV testing of individuals convicted of prostitution is
constitutional and, combined with education and voluntary testing
procedures, is one means of curtailing AIDS.161 Conviction, the cul-
mination of a criminal trial, provides a conclusive determination that
an individual is in a high risk group.
Some state legislatures have proposed and adopted legislation re-
quiring mandatory HIV testing of those arrested for prostitution.
Regulations allowing testing on arrest are unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment because they fail to satisfy the warrant require-
ment, fail to check the discretion of the police, and unreasonably in-
trude on individuals who have not been shown to be a member of a
high risk group. The court in Arata stated:
One of the most important rights guaranteed under our Constitu-
tion, that of the liberty of the citizen, is involved and cannot be
lightly passed over, nor can encroachments upon that right be toler-
ated even under the argument that, in the main, the general result
sought is a beneficent one.162
161. It is interesting to note that an effective way of curtailing the spread of the HIV,
although perhaps a less socially popular alternative, may be the legalization of prostitution.
In Nevada, the only state in the nation in which prostitution is legal and regulated, an 18-
month program of mandatory testing did not reveal a single working prostitute who tested
positive for HIV. See No Infection in Nevada Brothels, N.Y. TIMas, Nov. 3, 1987, at C3.
Nevada also imposes criminal sanctions on prostitutes who engage in prostitution after
testing positive for the HIV. Id. Prostitutes who ply their trade after testing positive face
sentences of up to 20 years in prison. NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 201.358 (Michie Supp.
1989).
162. Ex parte Arata, 198 P. at 816.
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States desiring mandatory HIV testing prior to conviction must
craft legislation that requires a hearing to show reasonable suspicion
that the person arrested is a prostitute, and thus a member of a high
risk group. Without such a requirement, the legislation will fail to sat-
isfy established Fourth Amendment standards.
